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Effective date: [[EFFECTIVE DATE]]
Who is responsible for your data: [[LEGAL ENTITY NAME]], [[POSTAL ADDRESS]] ("we", "us"). Email: [[CONTACT EMAIL]].
This policy covers the Nightjar app for iPhone and iPad, and the small server that some features in a future version will use. It is written to match what the app actually does. Where a feature is not in the current version, the policy says so. In the current version, the app sends nothing to us at all. On the free plan, the ad network that shows its one small ad receives the limited data in 3.13; that goes to Google, not to us. Where this policy says "iPhone" or "phone", the same applies to an iPad running Nightjar: vaults, keys and intruder photos stay on that iPad (iPads with Touch ID or Face ID have a Secure Enclave, used the same way), and a vault on your iPad is separate from one on your iPhone.
The short version
- Nightjar has no account. We don't know who you are.
- Your photos, videos, documents, notes, cards, IDs and saved logins are encrypted on your iPhone and stay there. We never receive them.
- In this version, no vault content ever goes to our server. Send securely makes an encrypted file on your iPhone that you send yourself, with iOS's share sheet; it never passes through us. Sharing a vault through our server and emergency envelopes are built but switched off in this version.
- In this version, the app makes no connection to us at all: no account, no usage statistics, no feedback form, nothing in the background. If you write to support, you do it from your own email app, and that email is the only thing we receive.
- Intruder photos never leave your phone.
- Purchases go through Apple. We never see your payment details.
- The free plan shows one small ad at the bottom of the gallery, from Google AdMob. It is not personalised: Nightjar never asks to track you and gives Google no advertising id, and nothing from your vaults goes to Google (3.13). Pro has no ads.
- We don't use any analytics company, and don't sell your data or share it for advertising based on what you do in other apps and websites.
1. Nightjar has no account
You don't sign up, sign in or give us a name, email or phone number to use Nightjar. The app creates no user id, no device id and no advertising id, and does not ask for tracking permission, so iOS gives no advertising id to anyone, including the ad network on the free plan (3.13). Everything in this policy is about what the app does on the phone, what reaches us if you email us, and what little would reach our server from features that are not in this version.
2. What stays on your iPhone
The following is created and kept only on your iPhone, in Nightjar's own storage and the iOS Keychain. We have no copy of it and no way to get one.
- Vault contents: every photo, video, document, scan and note you add, and their thumbnails. Each vault has its own random 256-bit key, and every file is encrypted with AES-256-GCM before it is written to disk.
- Cards, IDs and logins: bank cards (number, expiry, security code, PIN, billing address), passports, ID cards, loyalty cards, and saved logins (username, password, website, 2FA setup key, recovery codes, notes) that you add. They are kept inside the vault's own encrypted index; scans of a card's front and back are encrypted files like photos. 2FA codes are calculated on the phone from the setup key; nothing is looked up online. Card and passport scans are read with Apple's on-device text recognition only to suggest fields. Nightjar never charges, checks or sends a card anywhere, and nothing here is offered to iOS AutoFill in this version.
- The details around your files, not only the files: names, dates, folders, albums, item types and the vault's own index are encrypted too. On disk, every file sits in one shared folder under a random name with no extension, so a look at the folder shows roughly how much is stored and nothing else.
- iPhone backups: your vaults are not in the iPhone backups iOS makes (to iCloud or a computer). Nightjar marks its vault folders, including intruder photos and the inbox for items shared from other apps, to be left out of backups. The keys that open a vault are tied to this phone (marked "this device only", and the derivation needs this phone's Secure Enclave), so a backed-up copy could never be opened anywhere; leaving it out means a backup doesn't keep vaults after you erase them (with Erase everything or a duress secret), doesn't use your iCloud storage, and doesn't show how much you store or when. Nightjar's settings (in iOS's own preferences) are still backed up; they hold nothing from inside a vault. A backup made by a version before 17 November 2026 may still hold the encrypted files, which can't be opened; if such files reach another iPhone, the app explains that instead of showing a lock screen. To move vaults to a new iPhone, Nightjar's own encrypted backup is coming in a later version (3.7).
- Your unlock secret: your pattern, PIN or passphrase is never stored. The app runs it through a deliberately slow key-derivation step and then through the iPhone's Secure Enclave in a step that is different for every attempt, so the keys are tied to this specific phone. On an iPhone without a Secure Enclave the app uses a secret kept in the Keychain instead, which is weaker, and the Keys screen says which path is in use.
- Your recovery phrase: 12 or 24 words shown to you once and kept inside the vault's own encrypted records so you can see them again from Settings. We cannot recover them for you.
- Face ID: iOS does the face check. Nightjar never receives your face data; it only gets an item back from the Keychain when iOS says the check passed. The item is invalidated if the enrolled faces change.
- Keychain items (all marked "this device only", never synced to iCloud Keychain): a device salt and device secret, the Face ID slot, the key that seals intruder photos, a salted hash of your disguise code, the key for the notes disguise, this phone's backup and pairing identities, the key that seals the emergency envelope check-in file (3.10), and, if you allow a paired phone to lock or erase this one, the keys needed to check its commands (3.11).
- Settings: your choices (lock timing, appearance, import quality, whether intruder photos are on, and so on) in the app's local preferences.
- Failed-attempt log: when and how many wrong unlock attempts were made, kept encrypted for 90 days or the newest 500 entries, so you can be shown "N failed attempts since you last opened this vault".
- Intruder photos: see section 3.8. They never leave the phone.
- Trash: deleted items wait in the vault's Trash, still encrypted, and are then overwritten and removed after the time you choose for that vault: 7, 30 (the default) or 90 days, or never. The choice is kept inside that vault's own encrypted index. You can shred items sooner. On iPhone storage, overwriting is best effort; what protects deleted items is that they are encrypted and their key is gone.
- Items shared into Nightjar from other apps: when you use "Save to Nightjar" in another app's share sheet, the extension seals the file to a key only the Nightjar app holds (X25519 + AES-256-GCM) before writing it to the shared inbox, so nothing waits there in the clear. The app decrypts it and moves it into your vault the next time you unlock. If the Nightjar app has never been opened on the phone, the extension has no key to seal to and keeps the file under iOS's own file protection until then.
- Photo and video metadata: photos lose their metadata when they are imported: location (GPS), camera make and model, lens, dates, software and any comments or XMP tags are removed; only the orientation is kept so the photo shows the right way up. Videos lose theirs on import too: location, camera make and model, software, creation dates and other identifying tags are removed, without re-encoding the picture or sound; only what is needed to play the video correctly (its orientation and duration) is kept. This applies to videos from Photos, the Files app, the in-app camera and other apps' share sheets. The date a photo or video was taken is read first and stored only inside the vault's encrypted index, for sorting by "date taken". An exported or shared photo or video therefore carries none of that metadata. Videos added before this version are not changed and keep whatever metadata they already carry, including a location if your camera recorded one. If a video can't be processed (a format iOS can't read, or no free space), it is kept as it arrived. A Live Photo is kept as its photo and its short video, and both parts lose their metadata in the same way.
If you delete the app, or use Erase everything, all of the above is removed from the phone and nothing on the phone can open the vaults again.
3. What leaves your iPhone, feature by feature
3.1 Send securely (Pro to send, free to open)
Send securely puts the items you choose into one .nightjar file, encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a passphrase you choose. The passphrase is stretched with PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations, the same key stretching the app uses for vaults, and the app asks for at least 10 characters and a strength rating of "Fair" or better. The file is made on your iPhone and you send it with iOS's share sheet, to whichever app or person you pick; it never goes through our server, and we never see the file, the passphrase or who you send it to. Photos lose their location and camera details on the way out. Videos lost theirs when they were imported; a video added before that change keeps whatever metadata it already carries (section 2). A Live Photo travels as its photo and its video, and opens in Nightjar as a Live Photo.
Anyone who has the file and the passphrase can open it. Anyone who has the file can try to guess the passphrase on their own computers, as often as they like, so only a long passphrase protects it. We cannot recover a forgotten passphrase.
Opening a file is free: in Nightjar, with the passphrase. A file opened from another app waits until a vault is open; its items are then added to that vault, encrypted like everything else in it.
3.2 Pairing two of your phones (not in this version)
Not in this version. The current version has no way to pair phones: there is no Paired phones screen and nothing is scanned or stored for it. Pairing is built and switched off, because everything it is used for (new-phone setup from a backup, shares to a paired phone, lost phone, envelope rights) needs a feature that is not in this version either. This section describes how it is designed to work when it ships.
Pairing will happen by scanning codes shown on each phone's screen. Nothing about the pairing itself goes through our server (the lost-phone relay in 3.11 carries commands between paired phones, encrypted, only if you use it). The pairing records live inside the vault's own encrypted index on each phone. Pairing needs iOS 26 on both phones.
3.3 Anonymous usage statistics (optional, off by default)
Not in this version. There is no statistics switch in the current version, and the app records and sends no usage events. This section describes how the switch is designed to work, so you can judge it before it is added.
When added, the switch will be in Settings and off until you turn it on. When it is off, the app records nothing and sends nothing. When it is on, the app sends, in batches, the following and only the following:
- the name of an app event, from this fixed list: vault unlocked; photo captured in the app; video captured in the app; item moved to Trash; wrong unlock attempt (with the number of consecutive wrong attempts); paywall shown; paywall closed; purchase button tapped (with the id of the plan tapped, such as monthly or yearly); unlock secret set during onboarding; Face ID turned on during onboarding;
- a session number: a random value the app makes up each time it starts and forgets when it quits. It cannot be used to recognise your phone from one launch to the next;
- the time of the event.
It never sends file names, vault names, how many vaults you have, what is in them, your secret, your phrase, your email, a device id or anything else. We use these counts to see which parts of the app are used and where people get stuck, and for nothing else. We keep them for [[ANALYTICS RETENTION DAYS, recommended 90]] days.
The events can only be sent if our statistics server is running.
3.4 Email support (only when you write to us)
In this version there is no feedback form. "Email support" (inside a vault in Settings > Help, and on the gear on the lock screen) opens a new message in your own email app, addressed to [[SUPPORT EMAIL]], with the subject "Nightjar support" and two lines filled in: the Nightjar version and the iOS version. Nothing else is added: no device model, no identifier, nothing from your vaults. You can change or delete any of it before you send. If no email app is set up, Nightjar shows the address so you can write from any account. Nightjar itself sends nothing: the email goes from your email account through your email provider, like any other email you send, and only if you send it.
What we receive is the email itself: your email address, the name your email account shows, what you write and anything you attach. We use it to answer you and to fix problems. We keep support emails until they are handled and for at most [[FEEDBACK RETENTION, recommended 12 months]] after that, in our support mailbox at [[SUPPORT MAILBOX PROVIDER]]. A support email is personal data under the laws in section 9, and you can ask us to delete it.
The in-app feedback form (not in this version) is built but switched off. When it is turned on, it will send your message, the app version, the iOS version and the device model (for example "iPhone") to our server, plus a reply-to email address only if you type one, kept as above.
3.5 Purchases (Apple)
Pro is bought through Apple's in-app purchase system. Apple handles the payment and knows what you bought; we don't receive your name, Apple Account, card details or address. The app checks your Pro status from the signed purchase record Apple stores on the phone and keeps a simple yes/no in local settings so it works offline. Nothing about purchases is sent to our server.
Pro comes as individual plans (monthly, yearly or lifetime) and family plans (family yearly or family lifetime); prices are shown in the app and on the App Store. The family plans are shared through Apple's Family Sharing with up to 5 family members. Apple decides who is in your family group and tells the app on each member's iPhone that Pro has been shared with them; we learn nothing about who is in your family. Each person's vaults stay on their own iPhone, and nobody in the family can see anyone else's photos.
Apple's own privacy policy applies to the purchase: https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/.
3.6 Crash reports and app analytics from Apple
Nightjar contains no crash-reporting or analytics software. If your iPhone is set to share analytics with app developers (Settings > Privacy & Security > Analytics & Improvements), Apple may send us crash logs and aggregate usage figures that Apple has already made anonymous. If that setting is off, we get nothing. We don't control that setting; Apple does.
3.7 Encrypted iCloud backup
Not in this version. There is no Backup screen or setting, and nothing is uploaded to iCloud. This section is reserved for a future update and describes how it is designed to work, so you can judge it before turning it on.
When shipped, backup will be off by default and turned on per vault. Everything is encrypted on your iPhone before it leaves. The backup key comes from the vault's 12 or 24-word recovery phrase only, never from your pattern, PIN or passphrase, so the phrase alone can restore the vault on a new iPhone, and a copy of the backup cannot be guessed at using a short pattern. The encrypted pieces are padded to a few fixed sizes and filed under random names in the private part of your own iCloud account. We have no access to your iCloud account and cannot see or restore your backup. Apple stores the data under Apple's iCloud terms. Anyone who has both your recovery phrase and your iCloud data can restore the vault, so keep the phrase safe. What is still visible to whoever holds the iCloud data: roughly how much is stored, when backups run, and how many phones have backed up, but not how many vaults or what is in them. With Pro, backup history also keeps one earlier version of the vault for each day of the last 30 days, with the encrypted files only those versions still use, in the same place and encrypted the same way; it uses more of your iCloud storage and ages out on its own.
3.8 Intruder photos (Pro, off by default)
If you turn on intruder photos, Nightjar takes a photo with the front camera after a wrong unlock attempt (the 3rd in a row unless you choose the 1st or 2nd). It only works if you have allowed Nightjar to use the camera; the app asks for that permission when you turn the feature on. iOS shows its green camera indicator while the photo is taken, so the person may notice.
Intruder photos are encrypted with a key kept in this phone's Keychain and stored only on this phone. They are never uploaded, sent to us or shared with anyone. They are kept until you delete them (Settings > Intruder photos) or erase everything. Any vault you open on this phone, including a decoy vault, can show them.
You are the one taking these photos. You are responsible for using this feature lawfully where you are, including any laws about photographing people without their knowledge. See the Terms of Use.
3.9 Camera, microphone, Photos, Files, clipboard, NFC
- Camera: used to capture photos and videos straight into a vault, to scan documents into a PDF, to scan a card, ID or 2FA QR code, and for intruder photos (and, in a later version, to scan pairing codes on your other phone). Captured media goes into the encrypted vault, not into the Photos app.
- Microphone: used only for the sound of videos you record in the app. Asked the first time you record a video.
- Photos: importing uses Apple's photo picker, which shows you your library without giving Nightjar access to it; Nightjar receives only the items you pick. If you choose to delete the originals after import, Nightjar asks for Photos access at that moment, and iOS asks you to confirm each deletion. Deleted originals stay in Recently Deleted in Photos for 30 days.
- Saving to Photos: if you choose Save to Photos for photos or videos, Nightjar asks iOS for permission to add to your library only ("add photos only"). It writes the copies you picked and cannot read anything in your library through that permission. The copies are ordinary, unencrypted photos and videos in the Photos app, outside the vault's protection, and are included in iCloud Photos if you use it; the app warns you before the first save. To hand them to Photos, Nightjar decrypts each item to a protected temporary file and deletes it right after. Live Photos are saved as Live Photos (Nightjar writes a new pairing identifier into both parts, since import removed the original one); nothing else is added to them.
- Files: importing from Files uses Apple's document picker; Nightjar receives only what you pick.
- Password import and export: importing logins reads the CSV file you pick (exported from Apple Passwords, 1Password, Bitwarden or similar) once, on the phone. Nightjar does not keep or delete that file; it is not encrypted, so the app asks you to delete it yourself. Exporting writes your logins to a CSV file only when you ask, after Face ID or your vault's secret; the file is plain text, kept in a temporary folder that is emptied when you close the export screen or the vault locks, and goes wherever you choose to save or send it.
- Clipboard: "Paste from Clipboard" reads the clipboard only when you tap it. Copying a phrase or PIN from Nightjar puts it on this phone's clipboard only (not Universal Clipboard) and clears it after 60 seconds. Copying a password, card number or 2FA code does the same and clears it after 30 seconds; showing or copying one first asks for Face ID or your vault's secret.
- NFC and Lightning (YubiKey, Pro; not in this version): YubiKey support is built but switched off until it has passed testing on real hardware. When it is on: if you set up a YubiKey as a second key for a vault, Nightjar talks to the key over NFC or the Lightning port to get a challenge-response answer. That answer is used on the phone to unlock the vault. Nothing about your key is sent to us or to Yubico.
None of these permissions is used for anything other than the feature you are using them for.
3.10 Emergency envelopes (Pro)
Not in this version. Emergency envelopes are built but switched off in the current version of the app, and nothing described here is sent. This section describes how they work, so you can judge them before they are turned on.
An emergency envelope holds items and an optional message you choose, for people you name. If you don't open Nightjar for the time you choose (7, 14 or 30 days), our server emails them a link to it.
- On your iPhone, the chosen items and message are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key made from a random envelope key. You give the envelope key to the recipient yourself (by AirDrop, a message or on paper). It is never sent to our server, so we cannot open the envelope, and without the key the recipient can't either. Photos lose their location and camera details first.
- What our server stores: the encrypted envelope (up to 100 MB); a random envelope id; the email addresses of the recipients you entered (up to 5); the time limit you chose; when you last checked in; whether it is paused; the optional short note you write for the email, which is stored and sent as plain text (it is not encrypted, so the app tells you to keep anything private inside the envelope); hashes of the tokens your phone uses to manage, check in and release it; and the date until which your Pro subscription was last reported to be paid (or "lifetime"), which your phone sends at each check-in and which we do not verify with Apple.
- Checking in: any unlock of Nightjar on your phone sends a check-in for each envelope (the envelope id and a check-in token, nothing else). Your phone also schedules local reminders a few days and a day before release; these are made on the phone, not by us.
- Release: an envelope is released when a check-in is missed, when you release it by hand, when the duress secret is used (if you chose that), or from a paired phone you gave that right to (3.11). On release our server emails each recipient a link to a page on our server. The email does not contain the key, anything from inside the envelope or your name (unless you wrote it in the note). Once the emails are sent, the recipients' addresses are deleted from our server.
- The recipient's page is served by our server. It downloads the encrypted envelope and decrypts it in the recipient's browser with the key they paste or scan; the key is read from the part of the link that browsers never send to a server. The page loads nothing from other sites and has no analytics. A recipient can also open an envelope in the Nightjar app, for free.
- Email delivery: emails are sent by an email delivery provider acting for us, [[EMAIL PROVIDER, recommended Postmark]], which receives each recipient's address, the subject and the plain-text body for the purpose of delivering it. Open tracking and link tracking are turned off, and the emails are plain text with no images. Until a provider is set up, no emails are sent.
- Deletion: you can edit, pause or delete an envelope at any time; deleting removes it, its content and the addresses from our server at once. A released envelope is deleted 30 days after release. An unreleased envelope is deleted 30 days after your Pro subscription was last reported to end (never for lifetime Pro). An upload that was never finished is deleted after 24 hours.
- Recipients' details are about other people. You may only enter the email addresses of people you are allowed to give to us for this purpose. A recipient who wants their address removed can write to [[CONTACT EMAIL]]; we will delete it, which means the envelope can't be delivered to them.
3.11 Lost phone: lock or erase from a paired phone (Pro)
Not in this version. Built but switched off in the current version.
If you allow it on a phone, a phone you paired with it (3.2) can send it a "lock" command, or an "erase" command that also needs your vault's secret typed on the sending phone. The same channel carries the right to release an emergency envelope (3.10) to a paired phone you choose.
- Through our relay: the command is posted to our server under a mailbox name derived from the pairing key, which only your two phones have, and waits there until the other phone fetches it, for at most 30 days. Each command is encrypted and authenticated with keys derived from the pairing key, names its sender and target, and carries a random number and an expiry; the receiving phone refuses anything changed, expired or already used. Our server cannot read it or tell which phones it is for.
- What our server stores: the mailbox name, the encrypted command, and when it expires. It is deleted when the receiving phone acknowledges it, or when it expires.
- Delivery: Nightjar can't use push notifications yet, so a command runs only the next time Nightjar opens on the other phone, or when iOS gives it a background refresh. It may run late or never.
- Erase uses the same Erase everything as the lock screen and cannot be undone. An encrypted backup, if you have one, is not touched.
3.12 Sharing a vault through our server (Pro)
Not in this version. Built but switched off in the current version, and nothing described here is sent. This section describes how it works, so you can judge it before it is turned on. (To send items to someone in this version, use Send securely, 3.1, which doesn't use our server.)
When you share a vault, the app:
- makes a one-time share phrase of 9 words;
- re-encrypts every item in the vault under a fresh key derived from that phrase (the recipient never gets your own vault key);
- uploads the encrypted package to our server over HTTPS, in parts of up to 8 MB, up to 1 GB in all.
What our server stores for a share: the encrypted package; an opaque record id (a hash of the phrase, which does not reveal the phrase); the expiry you chose (1 to 30 days); the number of opens you allowed (1 to 20); how many times it has been opened; when it was created; its size and number of parts; and short-lived upload and download tokens.
What our server cannot see: the phrase, the key, or anything inside the package. File names, dates and the items themselves are inside the ciphertext.
What our server can see: that a share exists, its size, when it was created and opened, and the connection details of the sender and of whoever opens it (section 4).
Deletion: the server enforces the limits itself. A share is deleted when it expires, after its last allowed open (a share uploaded in parts stays readable for 30 more minutes so the download can finish), or 24 hours after an upload that was never completed. You can revoke a share early from the app. The server also runs a clean-up every hour.
Shares to a paired phone (not in this version): if you send a share to one of your own paired phones (3.2) instead of using the phrase, the package key is wrapped so that only that phone can open it. Files are encrypted with AES-256; keys exchanged between your devices use hybrid post-quantum (ML-KEM + X25519) encryption. The server stores the same things as above and cannot open the package.
3.13 Ads on the free plan (Google AdMob)
The free plan shows one small banner ad at the end of the gallery. Pro (any plan, including one shared through Family Sharing) shows none.
- Where ads never appear: the lock screen, disguises, a decoy (duress) vault, setup, the paywall, Settings, and the screens for cards, passwords, 2FA codes and recovery words. No full-screen or video ads.
- Who shows them: Google AdMob, run by Google (Google Ireland Limited in the EEA, UK and Switzerland; Google LLC elsewhere). Google decides how it uses this data, as a separate controller, under its own policy: policies.google.com/technologies/partner-sites and policies.google.com/privacy.
- Not personalised: Nightjar never asks for tracking permission, so iOS gives Google no advertising id, and every ad request is marked as not personalised. Ads are chosen by the app, your country and language, not by what you do in other apps or websites. Ad content is limited to a general audience.
- What Google receives to show an ad: your IP address (from which it can tell roughly your country or city), device and app information (model, iOS version, language, app version), an identifier Google may set for this app to limit how often the same ad shows and to stop fraud, and whether an ad was shown or tapped.
- What Google never receives: anything from inside a vault: no photos, videos, files, notes, cards, logins, vault names or counts, and nothing about which screen you are on beyond "the gallery".
- In the EEA, the UK and Switzerland, Google's consent form appears once, inside the app after setup, before any ad is requested, as the law requires. If you decline, Google shows "limited ads" that use no cookies, identifiers or personal data for advertising. Change your answer any time in Settings > Ad privacy choices.
- We receive nothing about you from the ads. AdMob gives us only totals (how many ads were shown and what they earned), with nothing that identifies you.
4. Our server
In this version, the app doesn't connect to our server at all. No feature in it uses the server, and the app has no way to reach it. The server is for features that are not in this version: the optional statistics (3.3), the in-app feedback form (3.4), sharing a vault (3.12), emergency envelopes (3.10) and the lost-phone relay (3.11). Send securely (3.1) never uses it. When any of these is turned on, this policy will say so first. The server will run at [[BACKEND HOST / PROVIDER]] in [[BACKEND REGION]]. Connections use HTTPS.
The rest of this section describes the server for when those features are turned on.
Connection details. Any server sees the internet address (IP address) of the device that connects to it. Our server uses your IP address to limit how many requests one connection can make (for example, 10 feedback messages an hour), holding it in memory for at most one hour and never writing it to disk. Our server does not record IP addresses in its logs. Our hosting provider may keep its own connection logs, including IP addresses, for up to [[HOST LOG RETENTION DAYS]] days for security and abuse prevention; we don't use those logs to identify anyone.
Admin access. The server has an operator token used only to run clean-up and to edit text the server can serve. It would have no way to decrypt a share or an emergency envelope once those features are turned on.
Apple's services. The app does talk to Apple, not to us: in-app purchases and restoring them, the App Store review prompt, and opening the App Store or a web page when you tap a link (which opens in Safari, under Safari's and that site's terms). See 3.5 and 3.6.
4.1 Our website
The pages at [[WEBSITE URL]] (including this policy) are static. They run no analytics script, set no tracking cookies and load nothing from advertising or analytics companies. The site's host, [[WEBSITE HOST]], may keep ordinary connection logs for up to [[HOST LOG RETENTION DAYS]] days. If we ever add measurement to the site, we will say so here first.
5. Who else receives data
- Apple. Purchases (3.5), the optional crash and usage reports you share with Apple (3.6), and, in a future version, iCloud backup in your own account (3.7). Apple is a separate controller of that data under its own policy.
- Our support mailbox provider, [[SUPPORT MAILBOX PROVIDER]], which stores the support emails you send us (3.4). It acts on our instructions.
- Our hosting provider, [[BACKEND HOST / PROVIDER]]: in this version, nothing from the app. Once server features are turned on, it would store the server's database (statistics events, feedback, encrypted shares and envelopes, envelope recipients' addresses until they are emailed, and relayed commands) and may keep connection logs (section 4). It acts on our instructions.
- Our email delivery provider, [[EMAIL PROVIDER, recommended Postmark]], only when an emergency envelope is released (3.10; not in this version): it receives each recipient's address and the email. It acts on our instructions, with open and link tracking off.
- Google (AdMob), on the free plan only: the limited data in 3.13, to show one non-personalised ad. Google is a separate controller of that data under its own policy. Pro sends Google nothing.
- Nobody else. No other advertising networks, no analytics companies, no data brokers. We don't sell personal data and have never done so.
If we are required by law to hand over what we hold, in this version that can only be support emails you sent us; the app itself sends us nothing. Files made with Send securely never reach us, so we have nothing to hand over about them. Once server sharing and emergency envelopes are turned on, the most we could hand over about a share is its ciphertext and the details in 3.12, which don't include the phrase or the key; about an emergency envelope, its ciphertext and the details in 3.10, which don't include the envelope key.
6. How long we keep data
| Data | Where | Kept for |
|---|---|---|
| Vault contents, keys, settings, attempt log, intruder photos | Your iPhone only | Until you delete them or the app. Trash: 30 days by default (7, 90 or never, per vault). Attempt log: 90 days or 500 entries. |
| Send securely files | Wherever you send them; never our server | We never receive them |
| Shared vault package and its record (not in this version) | Our server | Until it expires (1-30 days, your choice), after its last allowed open (plus 30 minutes for a chunked download), or 24 hours after an unfinished upload. Revocable early. |
| Emergency envelope (encrypted content, timer, token hashes) (not in this version) | Our server | Until you delete it; 30 days after release; 30 days after Pro was last reported to end if unreleased (never for lifetime); 24 hours for an unfinished upload |
| Envelope recipients' email addresses (not in this version) | Our server | Until the release emails are sent, or the envelope is deleted |
| Envelope release emails (not in this version) | [[EMAIL PROVIDER, recommended Postmark]] | Per the provider's retention, [[EMAIL PROVIDER RETENTION]] |
| Lost-phone commands and release rights (not in this version) | Our server | Until the receiving phone acknowledges them, at most 30 days |
| Support emails you send us | Our support mailbox, [[SUPPORT MAILBOX PROVIDER]] | Until handled, then at most [[FEEDBACK RETENTION, recommended 12 months]] |
| Statistics events (opt-in; not in this version) | Our server | [[ANALYTICS RETENTION DAYS, recommended 90]] days |
| In-app feedback and optional email (not in this version) | Our server | Until handled, then at most [[FEEDBACK RETENTION, recommended 12 months]] |
| IP address for rate limiting (only once server features are on) | Our server, in memory | Up to 1 hour, never on disk |
| Hosting provider connection logs (only once server features are on) | [[BACKEND HOST / PROVIDER]] | Up to [[HOST LOG RETENTION DAYS]] days |
| Purchase records | Apple | Per Apple's policy |
| Ad request data (free plan only, 3.13) | Per Google's policy (policies.google.com/technologies/retention); we never receive it |
7. Security, honestly
- Files are encrypted with AES-256-GCM, each vault under its own random key, and the key material is bound to your iPhone's Secure Enclave as described in section 2. Large files are encrypted in chunks, and every file and every chunk gets its own fresh nonce, so two identical photos don't produce identical ciphertext and a cut-off or altered file fails to open instead of opening wrong.
- What the Secure Enclave does and doesn't do: it takes part in turning your secret into the vault key, which is what ties the keys to this phone. The file encryption itself runs in the app, so while a vault is open its keys are in the app's memory. Locking, switching to another app, the idle timer, flipping the phone face down or a screenshot lock drops them, along with what was decrypted to show the vault (the list of items, cards and logins) and any temporary decrypted copies; after a crash the next launch needs a fresh unlock and deletes any temporary copies left behind. Clearing keys from memory is best effort: the app wipes the buffers it controls, but can't prove that no copy exists elsewhere in memory.
- What you have to trust: your iPhone itself, iOS and its Keychain, and the Nightjar app. A jailbroken or otherwise compromised iPhone can read the screen, the keyboard, memory and exported files, and no encryption in the app changes that. Use Nightjar on an iPhone with a passcode that isn't jailbroken.
- There is no list of vaults anywhere on the phone or on our server. The folder that holds vault headers always looks the same whether you have one vault or many, which is also what makes a decoy vault possible.
- Wrong attempts slow down: a 30-second wait after 3, a minute after 4, 5 minutes after 5, and 15 minutes after 10. The wait survives restarting the app and changing the clock. You can choose to have everything erased after 10 wrong attempts.
- Screenshots and screen recordings of an open vault come out black by default. iOS can't stop a screenshot being taken; this relies on how iOS treats password fields and could stop working in a future iOS. You can turn it off.
- Lock on screenshot is on by default (Settings > Screen > Lock when a screenshot is taken). Taking a screenshot, or starting a screen recording or screen mirroring, while a vault is open locks it at once (a decoy vault the same way), and the lock screen says why ("Locked because a screenshot was taken." or "Locked because screen recording started.") until the next unlock. iOS tells apps about a screenshot only after it has been taken, so this can't stop the screenshot itself; with screenshot blanking on (the default), that screenshot is already black. It doesn't apply on the lock screen, in a disguise or during setup. A recording or mirroring already running when you unlock doesn't lock the vault again (only the start of one does), so AirPlay mirroring stays usable. This happens on the phone and sends nothing anywhere.
- Send securely files are protected by their passphrase alone: whoever has a file can try passphrases offline, on their own computers, with no wait between attempts. The slow key stretching (3.1) makes each guess costly, but only a long passphrase protects the file.
- When sharing a vault through our server is turned on (not in this version), our server stores only ciphertext for shares, and the code that enforces expiry and open counts runs on the server, not in the app.
- Limits we want you to know about: a short pattern or PIN is the weakest link, and someone running code on your unlocked phone could try guesses there. On a phone without a Secure Enclave, someone who extracts the Keychain could try guesses on another computer. Overwriting deleted files is best effort on flash storage; the real protection is the encryption. The design has not yet had an independent security audit.
- If our server is breached: the most that could be exposed is what section 4 and the retention table list. In this version the app sends nothing to our server, so there is nothing from the app to expose; a breach of our support mailbox could expose support emails you sent us. Once those features are turned on, it would also include encrypted share packages and envelopes, envelope recipients' email addresses until they are emailed, and relayed lost-phone commands. If a breach affects personal data we hold, we will tell the people affected and the authorities where the law requires it, within the deadlines the law sets (72 hours to the authority under GDPR).
- No method of storage or transmission is perfectly secure, and we don't claim Nightjar is.
8. Your choices
- Statistics: not in this version; nothing is recorded or sent. When added, it will be a switch in Settings, off by default.
- Intruder photos: Settings > Security. Off by default. Delete them any time from Settings > Intruder photos.
- Lock on screenshot and screenshot blanking: Settings > Screen. Both on by default.
- Camera, microphone, Photos: iOS Settings > Nightjar.
- Send securely: you choose what goes into each file, the passphrase and who gets it. We can't call a file back once it's sent.
- Shares (not in this version): once sharing a vault through our server is turned on, revoke a share before it expires from the share's screen in the app.
- Emergency envelopes (not in this version): edit, pause or delete one from Settings > Emergency envelope; deleting removes it from our server at once.
- Lost phone (not in this version): turn off lock and erase for a paired phone in Paired phones > that phone > Lost phone.
- Support emails: write to [[CONTACT EMAIL]] to have an email you sent us deleted. Tell us roughly when you sent it and from which address, since we have no other way to find it.
- Delete everything on the phone: the gear on the lock screen > Erase everything, or delete the app.
- Ads (free plan): in the EEA, UK and Switzerland, Settings > Ad privacy choices changes your answer to Google's consent form. Anywhere, Pro removes ads entirely. Nightjar never asks for tracking permission; iOS Settings > Privacy & Security > Tracking shows that.
- Subscriptions: manage or cancel in iOS Settings > your name > Subscriptions. Refunds are handled by Apple at reportaproblem.apple.com.
9. Your rights
9.1 If you are in the European Economic Area, the United Kingdom or Switzerland (GDPR and UK GDPR)
We are the controller for the little personal data that reaches us. Our legal bases are: performance of a contract (answering your support email; and, once those features are turned on, running the share or emergency envelope you asked for); legitimate interests for the email addresses of envelope recipients (once envelopes are turned on), which the owner gives us so we can deliver the envelope to them (a recipient can object at any time by writing to us); consent, collected by Google's consent form, for Google's processing for the free plan's ads (3.13), which you can change in Settings > Ad privacy choices; consent (once they are added, the optional statistics switch and the feedback form's optional reply-to email, both of which you can withdraw at any time, with no effect on what was done before); and legitimate interests (rate limiting and abuse prevention on the server, keeping the service secure). We don't make automated decisions about you and don't profile you.
You have the right to ask us for access to, correction of, or deletion of your personal data, to restrict or object to our processing of it, to receive it in a portable form, and to withdraw consent. Because we hold no account and no identifiers, the only personal data we can usually find is a support email you sent us. Once sharing a vault through our server is turned on, shares will be deleted on their own schedule, and we cannot find yours without the phrase. To exercise a right, email [[CONTACT EMAIL]]. We answer within one month. You can also complain to your data protection authority; in the UK that is the Information Commissioner's Office (ico.org.uk). [[IF THE ENTITY IS OUTSIDE THE EEA/UK: name and address of the EU and/or UK representative, or state that none is required and why.]]
9.2 If you are in California (CCPA/CPRA)
In the last 12 months we have collected these categories of personal information, and only if you emailed us: identifiers (your email address and the name your email account shows) and user content you send us (what you wrote and attached). The app itself sends us nothing in this version. Once statistics, the feedback form, server sharing and emergency envelopes are turned on (not in this version), they would add internet or network activity (the statistics events in 3.3 and the connection details in section 4), an IP address held briefly for rate limiting, a feedback message, and the email addresses of emergency envelope recipients, given to us by the envelope's owner (identifiers), and a shared vault package or envelope we cannot read (user content). We use them for the purposes in this policy and disclose them only to our hosting provider as a service provider. On the free plan, Google receives the limited data in 3.13 to show a non-personalised ad; it is not used for cross-context behavioural advertising (Nightjar never allows tracking) and is not exchanged for money with us. We do not sell personal information, do not share it for cross-context behavioural advertising, and do not use or disclose sensitive personal information to infer characteristics about you. We have no actual knowledge that we collect personal information from anyone under 16.
You have the right to know what we collect, to delete it, to correct it, to limit the use of sensitive personal information (we collect none), and not to be discriminated against for exercising your rights. To make a request, email [[CONTACT EMAIL]]. Since we have no account, we verify a request by replying to the email address the request concerns. You may use an authorised agent; we will ask the agent for proof of your permission. [[CONFIRM with counsel whether the business meets a CCPA threshold; if not, this section can be shortened to the no-sale statement.]]
9.3 Everyone else
Whatever your country, you can ask us at [[CONTACT EMAIL]] what we hold about you and have it deleted, and we will do it unless a law requires us to keep it.
10. Children
Nightjar is not intended for children under 13, and we don't knowingly collect personal data from them. In the European Union, the United Kingdom and other places where the age of digital consent is higher, the same applies up to that age. The app is listed on the App Store with an age rating set by Apple's questionnaire, which reflects its content, not who it is for. If you believe a child has sent us personal data (in this version, the only way is an email to support), email [[CONTACT EMAIL]] and we will delete it.
11. International transfers
In this version the app sends nothing to our server. Support emails are stored by [[SUPPORT MAILBOX PROVIDER]] in [[SUPPORT MAILBOX REGION]]. Our server, once the features in section 4 are turned on, will be in [[BACKEND REGION]], and the data in sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.10 and 3.12 would be processed there. [[IF THE SERVER IS OUTSIDE THE EEA/UK: state the transfer mechanism, for example the EU Standard Contractual Clauses and the UK International Data Transfer Addendum with the hosting provider, or an adequacy decision.]] The free plan's ad requests go to Google (3.13), which may process them in the United States and elsewhere under its own transfer safeguards. Everything else stays on your iPhone, or with Apple under Apple's terms.
12. Changes to this policy
If we change what the app sends or what we keep, we will update this policy, change the effective date at the top, and, for anything that matters, tell you in the app before the change takes effect. Older versions are available on request.
13. Contact
[[LEGAL ENTITY NAME]] [[POSTAL ADDRESS]] [[CONTACT EMAIL]]
Support: [[SUPPORT EMAIL]]